Automating MovableType plugin migration during upgrades

MovableType 4.23 was released, and I had to upgrade a couple of installs.

As previously mentioned, I use (and recommend) a fairly customized server layout to handle my MovableType installations.

I hacked together this quick Python script to create symlinks (as needed) for MovableType plugins.

Obvious note, this ONLY works if you use the same directory layout as me.

The script essentially does this

1. loops a shared _plugins dir to figure out what plugins you have, and which need to support plugin and mt-static links
2. chdirs into _current to create necessary relative symlinks

simple, eh?

I’ve placed the script in one of my svn repositories:

http://svn.2xlp.com/Public/svn/MovableType/plugin_migrator/

As of the writing of this article, the current version is in tags/v0.01

Facebook owns my Social Graph… It shouldn't

###Key points:

– Social networks position themselves as new addressbooks
– Social networks decide their own Terms and Conditions of use. That is OK
– Exiting users not given the ability to remove shared content from site. Not OK
– Remaining users left with holes in addressbook. Not OK.

### Main Article

Facebook, LinkedIn, and various other Social Media properties have been fighting hard to monopolize user’s online time and become their de-facto addressbooks and ways to share photos. While these applications have proven to be a great tool for consumers, current practices and policies by the parent corporations have determined a ‘reliance’ on social networks a danger.

It’s time for consumers and corporations to rethink their use of social media.

Recently an industry colleague, Stephanie Frasco, had her account disabled by Facebook. I’m not going to comment on why it happened or what triggered it – it is up to Facebook to set their Terms of Service and make judgements on user activity, and I respect that.

What troubles me is the manner in which her account was disabled – and the ramifactions of it on online communities.

When Stephanie’s account was disabled, she lost her data ( or at least any sort of access to it ). This didn’t just mean that she couldn’t message friends through Facebook or play a third-rate Scrabulous clone called ‘Scrabble’ — it meant that Stephanie could no longer access the phone numbers, email addresses, postal addresses of her friends through the network. It also meant that she lost the ability to access the photos she posted online – or the ones friends had tagged her with. When her account was disabled it wasnt limited to ‘read only’, she wasn’t given a window or ability to download her content, she was simply disappeared… silently, quickly, without a blink of an eye.

Seasoned industry people will laugh “Well that girl was stupid — she should have had a non-Facebook listing of all her contacts people.” Seasoned industry people are smart like that – they don’t rely on Facebook or other websites to exclusively handle contact info… but social media properties are actively promoting themselves to the 100million plus non-industry users as their new online homes — and their new online addressbooks, to overtake their default pen&paper, computer and even cellphone versions.

What troubles me even more about Stephanie’s case, is that not only did she lose access to Facebook… but I lost access to her.

Contact Info on Social Networks is like a double edged sword: information is rarely entered by a user into their own addressbook, instead someone else’s information is incorporated into their social graph. This results in an addressbook that is always ‘up to date’ — but offers out-of-sync details when a user abandons an account or loses entries when a user deletes their profile.

People often ask the question “Who owns the Social Graph?” I recently wrote an 8,000 word primer / whitepaper on the legal and technical aspects of the subject, along with best-practice recommendations on ToS and Data Portability for FindMeOn’s corporate clients. ( It will be public soon folks! It’s getting a final review right now ). One of the largest hurdles to Social Graph portability that we discuss is access and sharing in relation to copyright and contract law ( i.e. what can be shared and under what conditions )

In the Frasco/Facebook case, those questions weren’t raised to my satisfaction. Facebook simply stated “We own your social graph”.

Except Facebook didn’t tell Stephanie that… they told it to me.

When Facebook disabled Stephanie’s account, they didn’t just keep her from logging in to their walled garden — they removed her from *my* Social Graph.

I no longer have her updates , postings, content that she shared… with all of Facebook or even with me. Facebook was nice enough to keep her imprint in my inbox and messages, although with an ’empty’ link and profile photo. ( which, incidentally, is one of FindMeOn’s recommendations for account closings ). However, she’s not in my addressbook – I can’t click her info and send her an offline email, I can’t see her in my friendlist, I can’t use Facebook as way to interact with her outside of Facebook.

What Facebook should have done, was to freeze her account as is. Within the constraints of the Privacy Policy / Terms-Of-Service , Facebook should have kept as much of her information active and available as possible — not as a service to Stephanie, but as a service to the 100+ users that incorporated her into their social graphs. At the least, Facebook users should have been sent an email stating “Person X in your addressbook has left Facebook. You have X days to copy/transcribe information that they made visible to you.”

Instead, what Facebook did was say “We own your addressbook. We own your Social Graph”.

I say “Not anymore”.

It is absurd and overly arrogant that Facebook has decided to say who can and can’t be in *my* addressbook. Not only am I limited to having an addressbook of people that ‘want’ to join Facebook’s walled garden, but now I learn that addressbook may be shortened as they prune network membership to their desires.

I’m glad that I keep my contact info off Facebook and up-to-date manually — and I pity people who do not.

I used to think Facebook was neat — but now I STRONGLY question it’s utility. What good is a tool that lets you manage contacts/relations, when it dictates which contacts/relations you’re allowed ?

Request for Business Plans

Rick Webb over @ The Barbarian Group just posted a company blog about “Request for Business Plans” — a growing trend where some management team comes together and tries to get a firm to build their business concept for them:

Today’s rant: RFPs that are secretly RPBs, or Request For Business Plan. Seriously. I can’t begin to tell you how many RFPs I’ve gotten that basically are asking us to start their business for them. They want to build the next Facebook or Flickr, and want to pay us something like $50,000 to build it for them. I am at a complete loss how anyone could really think this is reasonable.

Evil RBPs

Well Rick, welcome to Web Two-Point-One-Two-Five-Four-Nine, also known as “Two-point-D’Oh!”. At least these firms have had the common sense to try and get The Barbarians on board.

As you know, I’ve been busy the past few months leveraging FindMeOn’s technology and resources with a few NYC area startups while we deal with ‘those’ patent/trademark issues. By some stroke of fortune, one of these companies is working with TBG — which has kept me personally excited about the project (though it is odd to be working with old friends).

A slew of those RFBPs have been hitting my inbox and calendars as well, and I’ve been *amazed* at how ballsy and often grossly incompetent some of the teams are. Everyone has these great big ideas and great big eyes , but no one has any clue how to pull it off.

My most favorite recent meetings:

– Company A dropped 500k on development through PS firms to be “the next Facebook”, but didn’t have any in house tech or marketing or bizdev – everything was contract. They wanted my team to audit + manage tech and create a monetization strategy using our profile analytics and segmentation strategies. We didn’t think they could last 3 months and declined; they lasted four before going bankrupt.

– Company B wanted to partner with FindMeOn to build a hybrid mobile/web social network for a 110Million user cellphone carrier: they would handle the front-end clients, we would handle the platform and revenue model. After a string of meetings and auditing their software, we realized they didn’t have any capabilities to handle the project and were trying to get us to spec out the deal and their business plan. It was still a good opportunity, so I offered to put the deal together for them at-cost – never heard from them again.

– Company C wanted to do a hybrid in-store/mobile/web customer retention and marketing program – and got a 800k quote from a professional services firm that they wanted to bring down. We trimmed it down to 350k, they countered “What can we do for 40-80k?” They also mandated owning all the IP and everything be done as SaaS so they don’t have to maintain. No one in the company seemed to have technology, mobile, or marketing experience — or the common sense that their total budgets were likely the fixed costs on the hosting itself.

On the inverse of RFBPs you have teams with a defined and well-thought-out business plan that just happens to be the worst possible idea. One of these groups came my way with a plan that seemed pretty solid, and raised a good seed from various sources. They knew exactly where they wanted to go, and how they wanted to get there — except they didn’t have the know-how to make it happen.

The result was a strategy was fine – but wrong for the market. While their team is full of proven leaders and visionaries, no one had a good tech or advertising background, nor did they know how to appease the VC circuit for common-questions or due-diligence. Instead of selling their existing strengths, their plan was more about leveraging the expected hottness of an unrealized product — which seriously undervalued their key market differentiators and revenue potential, and had no safeguards for when someone else offers the same exact product.

I had to convince them not hire us to do what they wanted — I couldn’t take their money and sleep at night. Thankfully, they listened. Not only is their new approach closing in on huge round but, just as I predicted, everyone-and-their-mother is now offering the same kitcshy tech they wanted to spend their budget on. Had they stuck to the original plan, they’d be out of business unable to adapt or compete — instead they’re now poised and ready to dominate a new industry that they concepted.

This got kind of longer than I meant it to, so three quick bullet points:

1. The average amount of seed capital needed to get a v1 startup beta up to VC fundable standards: 250-750k. The average online campaign (- advertising ) spend by brands: 250-750k

2. Exactly which startups successfully exited by farming out their Business Plan and entire technology to interactive agencies or Professional Services firms? I can think of one, and it wasn’t a good exit.

3. Everyone is pushing towards WhiteLabel offerings. I recently sat down with one of the top-3 providers who said these words of wisdom “Our system delivers beyond belief if you have an existing brand, a solid social media strategy, and want to farm out some heavy lifting. If you’re looking at us or our competitors to be a turnkey solution for your entire web strategy, you seriously need to rethink your business plan.”

Thoughts on Open Source, Open Standards, and Online Advertising : Data Sportability Pt 2

In 2005 I started FindMeOn after noticing some serious flaws in the use of OpenID. The base of the system grew out of the identity & publisher syndication components of a music website I had been working on with friends for a few years. When the music project went on hiatus, I decided to flesh out the identity system into its own entity. I wanted FindMeOn to be a full-fledged standalone / open source project to allow for secure online identity management/syndication because I truly cared about that, and no one else did at the time. On the flip side, years in marketing taught me the marketing value of information identity could deliver — so the system was designed to create a revenue model that gives brands & ad agencies better insight to their consumer distribution across networks.

From late 2005 to mid 2006 I met with dozens of agency execs, online experts and VC investors to vett my concept, and I learned my monetization scheme wasn’t enough — everyone required a higher monetization potential from it. By April 2006 the answer was clear: FindMeOn was not just going to offer cross-site information for dispersion intel, but for social demographics and online advertising… selling targeted advertising or media planning services.

I spent the next few months learning how the entrepreneur in me could reconcile open source beliefs with unadulterated american capitalism.

Maybe I’m wrong, won’t you tell me if I’m coming on too strong
==============================================================

With this in mind, I offer the following industry commentary. Keep in mind that this is pure conjecture from research and analysis; I can offer this only as insight not fact — but I am certain that it is accurate.

As I mentioned in my followup to DataPortability Podcast #5, The Facebook management team was absolutely brilliant in concepting their API strategy. I will easily credit them with getting the whole portability thing rolling by releasing their API – which set the precedent of a platform API that users and developers would adopt en-masse. It was working so well, that Facebook was gaining tons of user activity within-site, and gaining new developers to build applications FOR them. Facebook was also becoming a much bigger threat to their competitors than previously thought…

MySpace and the other major social networks suddenly had an entirely new level to compete on. While these other networks were constantly shifting between friend & foe with third party developers ( blocking their widgets, announcing partnership deals, repeat ), Facebook – who previously kept all widgets off their network – suddenly had a dedicated & robust *platform* dedicated to widget/app developers that was the darling of the internet community. Facebook was suddenly making developers happy, users happy, and — most threatening of all — showing a giant head start in this new ‘economy’ by seting the bar.

Lurking in the background was a stealthy figure who was realizing they would soon need to compete against Facebook: google. Why? Well, the search/advertising giant wasn’t worried so much about Facebook as a Social Media competitor, but what intelligence gleaned from Social Media could power — online advertising.

Here are some neat facts about the social media advertising market in the US in the Summer of 2007.

– Social Media advertising is the largest growing segment of internet advertising — as its the largest growing segment of the internet ).

– The 2008 projections for social media ad spends are around 800MM; the 2009 projections are 1300MM; and 1900MM in 2010.

– Social Media is probably the worst performing sector of online advertising. As an illustrative figure: its responsible for 90% of impressions, but only 10% of revenue.

A well optimized online publisher, like the New York Times, commands hefty eCPMs ( effective costs per 1000 ad impressions ) – upwards of $20; with a rumored $85 eCPM page monetization. MySpace is somewhere between .10¢ eCPM for a generic buy to $2.00 for an ultra optimized query — not very impressive.

Facebook has long been one of the best monetized social networks, consistently demanding eCPMs in the $1.50 to $8 range. A rumor was circulating in the Summer of 2007 that the Palo Alto firm was developing an off-site advertising network to display ads across the internet based on cookied data off their users. This is what Google was scared of.

As more population demographics adopt the Facebook platform, this rumored ad system increasingly jeopardized Google’s position as the internets premier ad network. Even more troubling, Google knew that Facebook had the talent and power to develop this competition — they weren’t just a large firm, but recruiting the new employees Google wanted first, and even hiring key staff members away from Mountain View.

There Ain’t No Second Chance Against The Thing With Forty Eyes
==============================================================

Google and MySpace had to respond – and act fast. So they come up with a daring little plan: they teamed up together to sketch out a competing platform, roped in a couple of other networks who were threatened by the burgeoning Facebook, and wanted to beat them with sheer numbers. Since Facebook had a ‘closed’ platform, Google decided to ‘open’ things up to foster more adoption with tons of “open standards” and “open source” — even calling their system ‘OpenSocial’. Through the use of the word “Open” everywhere, and multi-network capabilities, the new alliance of ‘once-enemies , now friends’ gathered against the mighty Facebook would hopefully woo more developers to the ‘OpenSocial’ market — stagnating Facebook’s platform growth.

As a quick side note, Google’s OpenSocial project kind of sounds like a whole lot like FindMeOn’s “Open SN (Open Social Network)” in both function and name. One would think their army of patent and trademark lawyers would have ‘googled’ their own product ideas for clearance…

Since everyone was trading punches over being more open and more awesome than the other guy, Facebook quickly had an equally brilliant reply — they subsidized free hosting through a partnership program with Sun and Joyent, started giving out cash grants to spur development, and their backing investors started a new VC fund focused solely on Facebook applications. Take that! said Facebook as a sea of developers eagerly built products for their platform.

You’ve got to roll with the punches to get to whats real
========================================================

Over the next four months, a plethora of large scale announcements would come from Google and Facebook as new players jumped into the fray.

Google decided to make OpenSocial a non-profit venture to bolster PR, even pulling in Yahoo to the relaunched initiative; the announcement was met by the praise of many tech-pundits, who talked about how wonderful the concept of a non-profit was. Predictably, everyone likened the initiative to civic minded non-profits – and none suggested the more relevant correlation: non-profit registered industry lobby fronts like the ‘National Smokers Alliance’ or ‘Global Climate Council’ that pipe tobacco and oil dollars into misleading consumer campaigns. Who can forget 2007’s hit webformercial “Carbon Dioxide: Some call it pollution, we call it Life”.

Nothing short of a ‘pissing match’ started between the large tech giants. In an almost round-robin fashion, each company would announce a new product that somehow ‘outdoes’ the last announcement from a competitor. Facebook expanded privacy controls, Google announced a ‘Social Graph API’, Microsoft jumped in with their ‘Windows Live API’, MySpace teamed with Yahoo and eBay to do ‘Data Availability’. Every other week, a new batch of PR announcements and partnerships are released — all accompanied by a hastily created set of documents, big-name backers, and incorporating one or more open standards while creating a few of their own.

These initiatives have been so hasilty and half-assed designed, that I wouldn’t be surprised if we soon learn that half of these products came solely out of the marketing departments, and the technology teams never saw anything until after a press announcement.

Today, *everyone* has an Open Standard and an Open Platform — myself included — which begs the obvious question: what good are open standards and platforms, if everyone has a different one? And are things really open when their main purpose is to further a proprietary system?

Perhaps more importantly – how many of the tech giants have collaborated with third-party developers to define these new Open platforms?

The industry’s modus operandi seems to be

1. BigTech decides what to open up and how
2. BigTech invites top widget makers / networks to be launch partners
3. Third party developers are then told “So this is how you’ll use it. Welcome to the new status quo. Happier?”.

Now I could be wrong — I’m three thousand miles removed from the SF bubble where all the ‘Open’ decisions are made — but I’ve yet to hear of any interactive agencies, dev shops, or brands who build/finance most of the ‘widget’ development being included in these conversations. I’ve been meeting with them non-stop to try and rectify that — and as of yet, no one I’ve met has even been polled by a large ‘platform’ for their input.

Thoughts on Open Source, Open Standards, and Online Advertising : Data Sportability Pt 1


Note

This is the first part of a series that I have been working on for a few weeks. The current combined text is 6,000 words – so I’m releasing it in sections.

Apologies to those who have been expecting this sooner — I originally wrote this in early/mid May, but have been busy with business too much to work on editing.

Preface
=======

I’ve been using a new term when I talk to people of the internets: Data Sportability. I use it to describe how sporty and flashy ‘data portability’ is, and how that flashiness and sportiness is the true essence of this new ‘movement’ (note: I mean the general movement of data portabality, not the Data Portability working group.

The utopian pitcure of interconnected networks… with data sharing, integration and portability abound is indeed something beautiful — but its just a veneer. Beneath the surface, or more aptly ‘under the hood’, it’s a vicious fight over who has the fastest car, the biggest engine, the latest fuel-injected cooling systems… you get the idea.

Like most services on the internet, Data Sportability isn’t about the end user, it’s about the big networks and service providers… and who has the coolest car.

I’m hoping it picks up, so people other than my friends know what I’m talking about.

Interested? Read on!

Too hot to handle
=================

Unless you’ve been living under a rock, “Data Portability” is hottest thing to hit the internet since the Paris Hilton sex tape… and as we all know in Paris’ own words, “That’s Hott!”. Also very much like Ms Hilton, portability is nice and pretty on the outside, but deeply troubled on the inside.

Here’s a quick history lesson-

Two years ago, the internet was a pretty different place than it is today. There were only a handful of major social networks, and most people ( users, pundits, experts ) looked at minor networks, niche ones (example: CafeMom), and social applications (example: LastFM, Flickr) with utter contempt. The major networks were also doing everything in their power to ‘lock’ users down into their systems — completing blocking images/videos/widgets etc from appearing on user pages whenever a service like YouTube or PhotoBucket had a popularity spike.

Thanks to technical innovations that lowered the barriers to entry, and whitelabel services like Ning and KickApps, everyone and their mother has a social network of their own today.

To maintain the loyalty of their userbases in then tens of millions, all the major players are quickly adapting with standards, platforms, and press releases touting how ‘open’ they are. Companies that recently charged users through subscription models to access their walled gardens are suddennly embracing openness, and pushing for new paradigms in the industry. And the pundits and network evangelists… they simply *love* talking about integration, open standards, and data portability ( as either the base concept or the new standards group ‘DataPortability.org’ ) — but that only raises the obvious question: why have so many groups gone a complete 180° turn?

The popular response ( aka: the public relations soundbite ) is that the networks are now proudly putting their users first; that we’ve all grown together, learned from our mistakes, and the old marketing department heads / decision makers have been replaced with new evangelists… embracing open standards and cooperation; Rainbows are everywhere and unicorns have magically appeared, frolicking in the streets.

Kool-Aid seems to be the most popular drink around.

It’s all about the benjamins
============================

Let’s be real for a second- the social internet isn’t about connecting people, it’s about monetizing their experience. Anyone who tells you otherwise is lying or stupid.

Once upon a time (or just nine months ago), Social Networks weren’t all that different from cellphone carriers in the way they operated — they locked you into a contract/network, made it a pain-in-the-ass to communicate with people on other networks, and basically held you hostage to not leave. If you manage to finally figure a way out of their maze, they magically offer you every single premium imaginable to stay.

A few years ago US the cellphone industry got regulated – users could finally port their phone number from one carrier to another. Citizens embraced this as finally seeing progress… but they didn’t realize it was at the expense of some shady stuff behind the scenes thanks to line items and back-room deals from industry lobbyists. After years of resistance the networks didn’t actually ‘cave’ in… they knew they eventually *had* to give in, so they figured out ways to handle it on their terms — protecting their end interests.

Data portability is pretty much the same, perhaps a bit more duplicitous… as a ton of extremely corporate interests are neatly packaged in a pretty little user friendly PR campaign. Data portability isn’t about empowering a user, or promoting open source and open standards — it’s about data mining, user tracking, and advertising efficiency.

I know because I’ve been there, I’ve done that; I helped write the playbook. My company FindMeOn was one of the first out of the gates selling the ‘Data Portability’ illusion — and over the past 9 months, every single big tech firm has gone through the exact same growing pains and learnings curves we did: they’ve released the same exact technologies, in roughly the same orders, even using roughly the same names.

So I’m going to talk about what FindMeOn was really up to all along, and explain what the new players in this arena are really doing — it’s anything but the grand illusion of user control. In the process I’ll predict the next few developments from bigtech, dispel some illusions, and recontextualize this faux openness into what it really is – internet marketing, plain and simple.

Some may point out dozens of pundits and developers who have only the best intentions. To that I say: sure they are — but look who pays their bills and is funding their research, it’s for a reason!

Is OpenID actually Open?

Note: There are updates following this posting

This has troubled me for a few years now…

I just asked the DataPortability group for clarification… but in a nutshell ( and reprinted below )

To-date, I’ve been unable to find any sort of licensing attributed to
the OpenID or oAuth specs.

To the best of my knowledge:
– neither has been explicitly placed in the public domain
– neither has been submitted to IETF, thereby covered by its IP
policy
– neither have released a CC or OSI license with their specs

The only licensing statements I’ve found in OpenID are in regards to a
non-assertation agreement and transfer of copyright to the OpenID
foundation. The foundation uses the goal “The goal is to release
every part of this under the most liberal licenses possible, so
there’s no money or licensing or registering required to play.”
However I see no license on any of the specs, just on the
implementation libraries.

Correct me if I’m wrong here, please… but shouldn’t these projects
have some sort of open licensing on their specs ? Microformats, APML,
XFN, FOAF, RSS all explicity use CC licenses on their specs. RDF is
covered by W3C. OPML has what seems to be a CC-noderivs. XMPP is
covered by the IETF’s IP policy.

Going by US Copyright and Patent standards, copyright is implicit and
technically rests with the authors/foundations; and technologies may
be patented until 1yr from date of initial public disclosure.

So my questions are:
1. Are there hidden open licenses or public domain placements that
I’m just unaware of ?
2. If there are no explicit open licenses on these:
– what does this mean? It’s great that the implementations are
license free, but could they be construed as violations of copyright /
patent / something at a future point ?
– how are two of the most popular ‘Open Standards’ the only two
without any sort of prominent licensing on their specifications ?

Basically, every single OpenStandard out there — even FindMeOn’s OpenSN ( Open Social Network ) and
findmeon node standards , have CC licenses ( usually share-alike, or attribution/no-derivs ), are covered by the IETF’s liberal open IP policies, have some sort of OSI comparable license, or are put in the public domain.

OpenID, and interestingly enough oAuth, have no licenses whatsoever.

Libraries of / implementations of the specs are released under OSI licenses, but the spec’s themselves have no visible licensing terms at-all.

How in the hell did both of these protocols get so popular – and backed by large companies – with nebulous licensing terms?

More importantly, is OpenID actually open?


Update #1: Gabriel Wachob has pointed me to https://agree2.com/declarations/oauth-non-assertion-covenant — in which the oAuth authors license the spec in with a CC license. I suggested he migrate that license to their actual website & spec , as every other project does. oAuth is definitively open.

Data Sportability

It’s nice to see everyone joining the portability and open standards bandwagon, and with such breakneck speed. It’s also great to see a complete 180° turn for many people involved — it wasn’t too long ago that many of the newly outspoken proponents of these concepts were the ones maintaining and enforcing the walled gardens of social media with an iron fist, holding users and third party services hostage at their leisure.

All the traction this movement has been gaining has made it very easy to get excited — quite a lot has happened in the last few months, and people are often still lauding some open technology just as its successor or complement is released. It can be quite difficult to keep up with, and amidst all this celebration a few important concepts have been lost or sidelined. I think we’ve come to a point where we all need to slow down for a moment and take a good look at the recent technologies and instead of blindly celebrating them, start asking some tough questions: like what are the implications of this, and why are they being created so quickly in the first place?

If you chat with industry pundits, read the blogs, even open up a major newspaper, you’ll quickly notice that data portability is all the rage (the general concept, not the ‘DataPortabilty’ working group). People love talking about the new efforts in interconnectedness on the internet — the ability to meld content and relationships across social media outlets, and the positive strides the industry is making. If you talk to a product manager or blogger ‘in the scene’ for a few minutes minutes, you’ll note how similarly they mimic an eleventeen year old girl talking about puppies, ponies and rainbows ( and ice cream! and unicorns! and rainbow sprinkles! oh my!).

Looking beyond the gloss of portability, there is a much more pervasive méme to the industry — the new marketing culture driving the open initiatives, Data Sportability. Before people can even hash out what products really are, we see fancy marketing jargon around corporate initiatives, an endless array of shiny new products and services launched one-after-another, and a figurative pissing contest between large technology companies trying to ‘outdo’ one another in terms of portability options and open standards. While data portability might be about getting people to join the bandwagon… Data Sportability is everyone trying to have the fanciest and flashiest wagon in the train, with hopes people will flock to it more so they can go off in their own direction.

When people can step back from the celebrations of technology, it is painfully clear that the new push for open data initiatives are not so open, well intentioned, or in many cases not even well thought out. I think it’s about time we put an end to Data Sportability and end this trend before any real damage is done.

Over the next few days I’ll be releasing a series of articles based on dispelling Data Sportability, using my company FindMeOn as the context. In 2006 we released FindMeOn.com and ‘Open Social Network’- a consumer site and set of open standards promising secure, privacy minded social network integration… which was really just a testbed for our ‘next generation’ social media advertising platform. In late 2007, Groups like Google, Yahoo and Microsoft started releasing similar products, under similar names, and going through all the same ‘realizations’ and growth spurts as our products.

Common Sense Truths Behind Portability
==================================

A preview.

The Open Movement is a Shell Game
————————————————
Open Source and Open Standards are absolutely meaningless when their point is to sell in proprietary platforms and services. Google, Facebook, Windows, MySpace, etc. are all promoting *their* platformed versions of portability. This isn’t a goodwill effort, this is an arms race for technology, users, and a market leadership position. Corporations are also very much focused on what THEY get out of being open — not end users; they’ve done a 180° on portability for a reason, they figured out how to monetize it.

Beware the Wolf In Sheep’s Clothing
————————————————
Being backed by, or creating, a non-profit is nothing more than a PR stunt. Lobbyists have been doing this for yers to mislead consumers on the behalf of the Tobacco and Oil industries. Being a non-profit doesn’t mean that you’re searching for the cure to cancer, or developing cross-platform software under the MIT license — it just means that your organization *as the organization* is not focused on creating corporate profits for itself. Groups like “OpenSocial Foundation” are industry associations of large social media stakeholders and advertisers – they’re not coming together to save children, they’re coming together to optimize their businesses.

The road to hell is paved with good intentions
———————————————————–
A lot of portability people mean well – but its important to view these innovations as the struggle they are — corporations are looking to monetize, technologists are looking to quickly adopt and push forward with every new innovation. When the dust settles and the novelty begins to wear off, a mess is often left behind. In politics, people talk about ‘inside the beltway’ — a disconnect between the political system and the people it represents, created by secluded and self-reinforcing culture of its members. Technology is the same way — technologists have the mindset of early adopters – and people who try to live their lives outwardly across all mediums; the average internet user is vastly different.

I recently got into a heated argument on the DataPortability group’s mailing list, when I was incensed by the lack of discussion covering user privacy ramifications of OpenID adoption — especially in a so-called ‘what could go wrong?’ panel discussion that was scheduled. From a consumer and corporate perspective, I am *deeply* troubled by the conflation of online account information and relationships hastily integrated systems promote.

Most people failed see any issue where a large one exists; a small subset of people saw the issue and replied something to the extent of ‘well some of us do care enough, and have implemented privacy constraints in our software’. My response: why is this not the default? why isn’t everyone adhering? why am I the only one questioning this?

More than meets the eye
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People are pushing data portability for a reason – monetizing openness. The monetary layer in data portability isn’t in being an open service, or providing a platform service… it’s in analyzing and applying cross-network user intelligence for internet advertising. Open platforms aren’t about providing a service to users, they’re about making money off of users.

They’re also about creating new commerce-driven standards. While MySpace, Google, Facebook are big names in Social Media, they’re the groups behind the world’s most powerful networks – not the people interacting with APIs and building new social media projects. While its nice to see these groups offering some ‘standards’ for interaction, they’re also saying “ok, but you have to play by our rules now!”. How different would these Open Standards look like if they were mandated by the widget developers, social media startups, or ad companies / corporate brands who are constantly building new online media projects? These ‘standards’ are concepts and hooks defined by benevolent dictators — not by the people who make applications.

PostgreSQL Rename Sequence Bug/Feature Fix

In PostgreSQL ( < 8.3 I believe ), if you rename a sequence you don't fully rename it This is recorded in bug 3619 http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-bugs/2007-09/msg00092.php

While the sequence will be renamed as an object, the metadata won’t…

PG stores the sequence name both as the object , and as ‘sequence_name’ in the sequence itself ( viewable via ‘SELECT * FROM sequence’ ; i think its in the postgres db catalog too )

Most people won’t run into an issue… until you use an ORM which is likely to pull the old sequence name from PG.

after much searching and trying, i found a fix. note: this only works for SMALL databases:

$ pg_dump -U$owner $db > $db.sql
$ psql -Upostgres
psql> DROP DATABASE $db;
psql> CREATE DATABASE $db WITH OWNER = $owner;
psql> q
$ psql -U$owner $db < $db.sql yes, that's the amazing fix -- backup up, dropping, and restoring the database. i'm sure there's a better fix out there somewhere -- i just couldn't find it with 2 hours of searching and syntax attempts. If you can find a better way, LET ME KNOW and I'll update this reference.

New Category – Scalability & Performance

I’ve decided to create a new category on Scalability & Performance

I recently learned that not enough people talk about this – and there are a lot of independent efforts that don’t cross communicate.

Since I’m plugged into a lot of misc communities, I decided to start talking about the different efforts in each — and where there is overlap.